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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
DANIEL J. PETERSON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030802-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where a suspect is lawfully detained outside in extremely cold weather, does the 
Fourth Amendment prevent police from checking the pockets of his coat before handing it 
to him? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The court 
of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, % 8, 13 P.3d 
576. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court 
accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, | 9, 22 P.3d 1242. The trial court's factual findings 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for 
clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Veteto, 
2000 UT 62, If 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The trial court's conclusions of law based on those 
findings are reviewed for correctness, "with a measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62,^8. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, 
a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) 
(1998 & Supp. 2002), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5, and § 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) 
(1998 & Supp. 2002). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant 
to a weapons frisk of his discarded coat and shoes. R30-23.1 Following an evidentiary 
hearing on 24 January 2002, the trial court orally denied the motion: 
*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
2 
The nub of this case falls on whether or not [Officer Billings] was justified 
in picking up that coat and checking it for weapons.. . . We expect officers 
to act reasonably and we, we consider whether or not they [are] reasonable 
by looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only imagine [] Barney 
Fife conducting a search, making sure the man had no weapons, and then 
turning around and handing him the weapon. How dumb is that. If, if 
there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon and to remove 
him from danger, and then immediately as a matter of courtesy hand him a 
coat[,] but not check it for weapons that's, that's ludicrous. 
And so my finding is that the the (sic), retrieval of the coat because 
of the totality of these circumstances was so closely related in time that it 
was reasonably related to removing [defendant] from the room, and that it 
was practically and reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make 
sure that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting the Terry 
frisk.2 
R210:52 (a copy of the oral ruling is attached in addendum B). The trial court 
subsequently clarified that defendant had not requested the coat and that it found the frisk 
to fall within the parameters of Terry: "[I]t[']s a reasonable check for weapons before he 
hands him the coat due to the fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is there, 
it's his coat[.]"R210:54.3 
Thereafter, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted for the lesser-included 
offense of possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R129. He was 
2See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3Although not expressly referenced by the trial court, presumptively, the trial 
court's ruling encompassed the frisk of defendant's shoes which immediately followed 
the pat-down of defendant's jacket. See R205:21;R212:111, 166; State v. Peterson, 2003 
UT App 300, f 5. The trial court did not rule on defendant's "Motion to Submit 
Judgement on Warrantless Search of Shoes," filed 25 January 2000, the day after the trial 
court's admissibility ruling on 24 January 2000. See Rl 17. Neither party took up the trial 
court's invitation to prepare written findings. See R210:54. 
3 
convicted as charged for possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor. Id. The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years for 
the felony offense and a concurrent indeterminate term of one year for the misdemeanor 
offense. R194-193. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R198. 
On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed. State v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 
300, Tf 13, 77 P.3d 646 (a copy of the opinion is attached in addendum A). According to 
the court of appeals, "when Officer Billings picked up [defendant's] coat and patted it 
down for weapons, he exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk[,]" because once defendant 
himself was frisked and taken outside, "[t]he circumstances that justified the pat-down, 
namely the search for weapons, were no longer present[.]" Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4 
On 28 December 2001, Officer Billings of the Provo City Police Department 
received an anonymous report that methamphetamine was being used by injection in front 
of small children at Dawn Webster's apartment. R205:6; R210:4; R212:105; State v. 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 3. Officer Billings and three other officers went to the 
4On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals and applies 
the same standard of review applied by that court. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, % 3. 985 
P.2d 911. The court of appeals reviews the facts in the record in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Delaney, 869 
P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript (see R210:4), in addition to 
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing; therefore, the State has included citations to 
the preliminary hearing transcript (see R205), along with citations to the suppression 
hearing (see R210), and trial (see R212) transcripts, in support of the trial court's ruling. 
4 
apartment to perform a welfare check. R205:6-7; R210:4; R212:105; Peterson, 2003 UT 
App 300, f 3. When Officer Billings knocked on the door, Dawn's mother answered. 
R205:18; R212:108; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 3. Dawn came to the door shortly 
thereafter. R205:7-8; R212:108; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 3. She consented to a 
search of her apartment and belongings. R205:7-8; R210:4; R212:108; Peterson, 2003 
UT App 300, p . 
Officer Billings followed Dawn to the main bedroom, approximately 25 feet from 
the door. R210:5; R212:109. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 4. The bedroom was 
unusually dark because the shades were drawn and the window was draped with a 
blanket. R210:9; R212:110, 137. Dawn stepped into the room and picked up her baby 
from the crib, Officer Billings followed. R210:6; R212:109, 134. Dawn and Officer 
Billings were in the bedroom for no more than three to five seconds when defendant 
unexpectedly bolted from the closet, startling both Dawn and the officer. R205:7-8, 27-
28; R210:6,9; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 4. Dawn "screamed out to her mother 
asking what the mother's boyfriend was doing in [her] bedroom"—Dawn had believed 
that defendant was in the kitchen with her mother. R205:33; Peterson, 2003 UT App 
300, f 4. 
Although the closet doors were open, Officer Billings had not seen defendant 
inside. R210:6; R212:109; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 4. Defendant's rapid approach 
concerned Officer Billings, who reached for his sidearm. R210:9; Peterson, 2003 UT 
App 300, f 4. Officer Billings also stepped back and ordered defendant to stop, turn 
5 
around, and place his hands where the officer could see them. R210:10; Peterson, 2003 
UT App 300, T| 4. He then handcuffed defendant and frisked him for weapons. R210:10; 
R212:138; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f^ 4. Finding no weapons on defendant's person, 
Officer Billings had another officer escort the barefoot and lightly dressed defendant to 
the front porch for safety purposes. R210:l 1, 14-16; R212:l 11; Peterson, 2003 UT App 
300, f 4. 
Because it was "extremely cold," "twenty degree weather," Officer Billings 
decided to take defendant some warmer clothes. R210:37; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 
5. He asked an approximately seven-year-old child also in the room if the coat defendant 
had been standing on belonged to him (defendant). R210:ll, 13, 15, 37; R212:lll-112, 
138-139; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5. The child responded affirmatively. R210:l 1; 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. Dawn confirmed that the coat was defendant's—he had 
been wearing it "when [she] answered the door." R205:34; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f^ 
5. When Officer Billings picked up the coat, he patted the pockets for safety purposes: 
"I'm not going to hand a coat with a loaded gun to somebody in handcuffs." R205:23; 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. The officer's frisk of defendant's coat was essentially 
instantaneous with the preceding frisk of defendant's person—separated by less than 60 
seconds. R210:13; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5. 
In patting down the coat, Officer Billings "felt something in the pocket. . . [that] 
[f]elt like a syringe." R210:11-12; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 5. Officer Billings took 
the syringe into his custody "so that it [could not] be used, destroyed, or used as a weapon 
6 
against any officers that were there." R205:10; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, | 5. A 
brown liquid in the syringe was later tested and found to be methamphetamine. 
R212:153, 155; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^  5. 
Shortly after Officer Billings found the syringe, Officer Woodall retrieved 
defendant's shoes, not more than three feet from the closet. R205:21; R212:l 11, 166; 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ^ f 5. In doing so, Officer Woodall saw a baggy filled with 
syringes inside one of the shoes. R212:l 19-120,167-168; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 
5. Once the syringes were removed, Officer Billings took the jacket and shoes to 
defendant, who was standing on the front porch in "20 degree weather," and placed him 
under arrest. R205:24; R210:21, 37; Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is no question that defendant was lawfully detained out-of-doors after he 
surprised Dawn and police by bolting out of a closet in a dark bedroom while police 
conducted a welfare check on Dawn's children. The only issue is whether the weapons 
frisk of defendant's discarded coat and shoes properly fell within the scope of the 
indisputably justified frisk of his person, as found by the trial court. The trial court's 
ruling is well-supported and the court of appeals' reversal is inconsistent with relevant 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the court of appeals' holding, that the officer 
safety justification for frisking defendant's jacket was "no longer present" once he was 
removed outside the apartment, is emphatically unreasonable, given that police properly 
7 
determined to hand defendant his jacket while he was detained in "extremely cold," "20 
degree weather." 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE A SUSPECT IS LAWFULLY DETAINED OUTSIDE IN 
EXTREMELY COLD WEATHER, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DOES NOT PREVENT POLICE FROM CHECKING THE 
POCKETS OF HIS COAT BEFORE HANDING IT TO HIM 
The trial court ruled that the frisk of defendant's discarded jacket fell within the 
scope of the lawful Terry frisk of defendant's person. R210:52, 54. According to the 
trial court, it would have been "ludicrous" for Officer Billings not to have checked 
defendant's jacket for weapons before handing it to him "as a matter of courtesy" while 
he was lawfully detained in "really cold" weather, and because it was "so closely related 
in time"—under 60 seconds—to the valid frisk of defendant's person. Id. See also State 
v. Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, ffif 6, 13, 77 P.3d 646. The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that "when Officer Billings picked up [defendant's] coat and patted it down for 
weapons, he exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk[,]" because once defendant was 
frisked and taken outside, "[t]he circumstances that justified the pat-down, namely the 
search for weapons, were no longer present[.]" Id. 
The court of appeals' holding overlooks the trial court's finding that Officer 
Billings reasonably sought, "as a matter of courtesy," to provide defendant his jacket 
during his lawful detention out-of-doors in "really cold" weather. See R210:52, 54. The 
court of appeals' holding thus forces Utah law enforcement to choose between leaving a 
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lawfully detained suspect outside in frigid conditions without proper clothing and handing 
him a coat that may contain a weapon. Because the Fourth Amendment does not mandate 
that humane law enforcement make this uncomfortable choice, the court of appeals' 
decision should be overruled. 
This Court recently reviewed the origin and limits of weapons frisks, observing 
that, under Terry, police "may perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when 
the officer reasonably believes a person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer 
or others.'" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 13, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
24). The initial detention of a suspect must, of course, be for a "valid reason," and "the 
officer's subsequent actions must be 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances' 
justifying the stop"or detention. Id (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). This Court 
reiterated that "[t]he sole purpose for allowing the frisk is to protect the officer and other 
prospective victims by neutralizing potential weapons. 'If a protective search goes beyond 
what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry 
and its fruits will be suppressed.'" Id. (case citations omitted). See also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 77-7-16, 77-7-17 (2003) (codifying authority for weapons frisks). 
Here, the validity of the Terry frisk of defendant's person is undisputed. See 
Peterson, 2003 UT App 300,113. Therefore, the only question is whether the 
contemporaneous frisk of defendant's jacket was "'reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances'" justifying the frisk of his person. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 13 (quoting 
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). Pertinent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the 
scope of a legal weapons frisk, demonstrates that it was. 
Terry's progeny has gradually extended the scope of permissible police conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that Terry, "need not be read as restricting 
the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1047 (1983). Police with reasonable suspicion that a suspect is dangerous and 
"may gain immediate control of weapons" can search a vehicle passenger compartment 
for weapons. Id. at 1049-1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This extension of Terry 
recognizes that "roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially 
hazardous," and that "[i]f a suspect is 'dangerous,' he is no less dangerous simply because 
he is not arrested." Id. at 1050. Indeed, "if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will 
be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons 
inside. Or, as [in Long], the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the 
Terry investigation is over, and again may have access to weapons." Id. at 1052 (citation 
omitted). 
Both this Court and the court of appeals recognize that Long extended Terry to 
authorize searches of a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons, "if the officer has a 
reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous.'" See 
State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (quoting long, 463 U.S. at 1052-55 
n. 16). See also State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that 
"the fact, taken in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an officer is 
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conducting a search does not overcome an officer's reasonable fear because the suspect 
may 'break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from [the] automobile'" 
(quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1051). 
The court of appeals and other courts, both pre- and post-Long, have extended 
Terry to uphold weapons frisks of, among other things, a diaper bag, jacket, duffel bag, 
motel room, knapsack, and paper bag. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 785 
(Utah App. 1991) (diaper bag); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-535 (8th Cir. 
1980) (duffel bag); State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) (jacket); Servis v. 
Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156, 160-161 (Va. App. 1988) (motel room); Jordan v. State, 
531 A.2d 1028,1031-1032 (Md. App. 1987) (paper bag); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 
828 (Haw. 1984) (knapsack). One case predating Terry by three months, and Long by 
fifteen years, upheld a weapons frisk of unworn clothing. See People v. Bowles, 289 
N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (1968). The essential recognition in these cases is that "there may 
exist circumstances in which the officer might 'reasonably suspect the possibility of harm 
if he returns [property] unexamined' and that in such circumstances the officer must be 
allowed to 'inspect the interior of the item before returning it.'" See 4 W. LaFave, Search 
& Seizure, § 9.5(e), p. 284 (3rd ed. 1996) (quoting Model Rules for Law Enforcement, 
Stop and Frisk, rule 605 (1974)). 
Like the foregoing authorities, the case at bar presents circumstances where "the 
officer might 'reasonably suspect the possibility of harm if he returns [property] 
unexamined.'" Id. Indeed, Long recognizes that a roadside suspect continues to be 
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dangerous even after being removed from his vehicle precisely because the suspect "will 
be permitted to reenter his automobile" at the conclusion of the investigation, or may even 
be "permitted to reenter . . . before the Terry investigation is over" and gain "access to 
any weapons inside." Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-1052. In this case, defendant was going to 
be handed his coat—given the "20 degree weather"—and could consequently access any 
weapon therein. R210:15, 21, 37, 53, 54. Given this unique circumstance, the safety 
concerns that allow police to check a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons before 
allowing a suspect to reenter likewise allow an officer to check a dangerous suspect's 
clothing before handing it to him during a lawful detention outside in "really cold" 
weather. Id. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-1052. 
Rather than analogize to—or even acknowledge—Long and the other pertinent 
scope-of-frisk cases cited in the State's Brief of Appellee, at pp. 8-10, 13, the court of 
appeals relied on two non-frisk cases and one case dealing with an insufficient 
justification for a weapons frisk, but not its scope. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, Iffi 
12-13 (citing State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 
100, 68 P.3d 1052); and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993)). Notably, none 
of these cases involved an ongoing safety concern. Thus, the court of appeals overlooked 
the continuing danger inherent on these facts—that while lawfully detained in frigid 
weather, defendant would be handed his jacket with a weapon concealed therein. See 
R210:52,54. 
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Contrary to the court of appeals holding, Officer Billings's pat-down of 
defendant's coat was eminently reasonable police action. Id, Indeed, it was even less 
intrusive than the frisks upheld in Terry or Long. It was less personally invasive than the 
"severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," upheld in Terry, 392 
U.S. at 24-25, because defendant was not wearing his jacket at the time it was frisked. 
See State v. Schultz, 491 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ohio App. 1985) (observing that search of an 
unworn coat "[was] a significantly less intrusive official act than a search of the person or 
a Jerry-type patdown"). And, it was both less intrusive and less expansive than the 
vehicle passenger compartment search for weapons authorized in Long because police 
frisked (as opposed to searched) only the specific items of clothing (as opposed to the 
whole of a vehicle passenger compartment) defendant discarded before bolting from the 
bedroom closet. 
The court of appeals' holding, on the other hand, that the dangerous circumstances 
justifying the frisk "were no longer present" once defendant was removed from the 
apartment, is hyper-technical. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, \ 13. The court of 
appeals' decision forces upon police officers a Hobson's choice: leave a lawfully detained 
suspect outside in frigid weather without proper clothing, or risk handing the suspect a 
coat that may contain a weapon. The United States Supreme Court eschews bright line 
rules like the "removal rule" adopted by the court of appeals in this case: "Much as a 
'bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is 
13 
unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid 
criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 683, 685 (1985). 
Moreover, as previously recognized by this Court, "[t]he touchstone of [an] 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 31 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19)). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 
(1979) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he key principle of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness—the balancing of competing interests"). "The Fourth Amendment is not, 
. . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, reviewing 
courts must be wary of 
allowing] the theoretical, sanitized world of [their] imagination to replace 
the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What 
constitutes 'reasonable' action may seem quite different to someone facing 
a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure. 
Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). 
Thus, while "the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been 
accomplished by 'less intrusive' means," given defendant's lack of proper clothing for the 
frigid weather, the humane decision to hand him his coat can hardly be characterized as 
unreasonable. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433, 447 (1973) ("The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have 
14 
been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search 
unreasonable5"). 
Finally, for the same reasons the frisk,of defendant's jacket was valid, the 
subsequent frisk of his shoes was also valid. See Peterson, 2003 UT App 300, f 5. 
Although unexplained by either the trial court or the court of appeals, this is so because it 
necessarily follows that if the jacket frisk yielding meth syringes was justified, the frisk of 
defendant's shoes immediately thereafter was at least as justified, if not more so, because 
it was preceded by probable cause to arrest. See R28-27, R205:21. "A search is not 
invalid despite the fact that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as the arrest and search are 
substantially contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the arrest exists independent 
of the evidence seized in the search." See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-1112 (Utah 
App. 1988). See also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, fflj 10-13, 52 P.3d 1158 ("[A]n 
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from it if is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record." (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
CONCLUSION 
If the court of appeals' hyper-technical "removal rule" is left intact, it will remain 
unclear to law enforcement and lower courts when and under what circumstances the 
Fourth Amendment allows protective frisks of a lawfully detained suspect's personal 
items which police seek to hand a dangerous suspect during or immediately after a valid 
15 
detention. This Court should therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision and affirm 
the trial court's admissibility ruling. 
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of methamphetamine, and possession of 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Defendant 
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f^ 1 Peterson appeals his convictions for 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp.2002), 
and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & 
Supp.2002). On appeal, Peterson claims that the 
search of his coat and shoes exceeded the scope of 
an otherwise justified Terry frisk. See *647Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968). We agree. We therefore reverse his 
convictions. 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 The facts of this case are recited in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings from the 
suppression hearing. See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 
4, 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
U 3 On December 28, 2001, Officer Russ Billings 
of the Provo City Police Department received an 
anonymous report that adults were using 
methamphetamine in the presence of children at a 
Provo residence. Officer Billings, along with 
several other officers, went to the residence to 
perform a welfare check on the children. A woman 
answered the door and informed Officer Billings 
that her adult daughter, Dawn Webster, was the 
tenant. Webster came to the door shortly thereafter 
and, according to Officer Billings, gave consent to 
the officers' entry and search of her apartment. 
<|[ 4 Officer Billings proceeded with Webster to a 
bedroom, upstairs and down a short hallway, where 
Webster's baby was sleeping. Webster and Officer 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 2 
Billings had been in the bedroom for approximately 
three or five seconds when Peterson unexpectedly 
emerged from the closet wearing light clothing and 
no shoes. Webster screamed out to her mother 
asking what the mother's boyfriend was doing in 
Webster's bedroom. [FN1] Startled by Peterson's 
emergence from the closet, Officer Billings stepped 
back and ordered Peterson to stop, turn around, and 
place his hands where the officer could see them. 
Peterson complied and Officer Billings then 
handcuffed him and patted him down for weapons. 
Finding no weapons, Officer Billings asked another 
officer to escort Peterson outside. 
FN1. Webster knew Peterson was in the 
apartment, but thought he was in the 
kitchen with her mother. 
U 5 Within about sixty seconds of the pat-down, 
Officer Billings noticed a coat on the floor of the 
closet where Peterson had been standing. Officer 
Billings asked a child who had entered the bedroom 
if the coat belonged to Peterson. The child 
responded affirmatively. Webster confirmed that 
the coat belonged to Peterson, and that Peterson had 
been wearing it when she answered the door. 
Officer Billings picked up the coat, intending to 
take it to Peterson. For safety purposes, he patted 
down the pockets of the coat. In doing so, Officer 
Billings felt a syringe in the right pocket. Officer 
Billings removed the syringe, which contained a 
brown liquid that later tested positive for 
methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another officer 
picked up a pair of shoes within three feet of the 
closet. Inside one of the shoes, the officer found a 
baggy full of syringes. Once the syringes were 
removed from Peterson's coat and shoj&^illfficer 
Billings took the items to Peterson who, by then, 
was standing on the front porch in the "extremely 
cold" December weather. Peterson was then 
arrested for drug offenses. 
If 6 Before trial, Peterson moved to suppress all 
evidence found in his coat and shoes, claiming it 
was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The 
trial court denied Peterson's motion to suppress, 
finding that the search of the coat and shoes was 
within the scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Peterson 
was subsequently convicted of possession of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Peterson 
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appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] H 7 "The factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the 
deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." State 
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996). 
ANALYSIS 
[2] [3] U 8 "The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees the 'right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.' " State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 
(Utah 1994) *648 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). 
However, "what the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches 
and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 
S.Ct 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
[4] 1f 9 "When an officer is justified in believing 
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others," the officer 
may conduct a pat-down or frisk "to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. However, 
such search must be strictly "limited to that which is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id. at 
26, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Professor LaFave explains that 
"the limited search permitted by Terry, it is 
important to remember, is to find weapons" that 
might be used to assault the officer. Wayne R. 
LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure Law: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 9.5(b), at 274 (3d ed.1996). 
Utah courts have consistently upheld limited 
searches for weapons under Terry. In State v. 
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct.App.1992), we 
stated that, under Terry, "when an officer 
reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may 
obtain immediate control of weapons, a protective 
search is justified." Id. at 870 (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Roybal, 716 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), held that an officer may 
conduct a protective weapons search only if "a 
reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] 
safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 293 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868). 
[5] U 10 In determining what is reasonable during 
a pat-down search or frisk, we must ask first 
"whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception," and second, "whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Peterson concedes that the 
frisk of his person was justified at its inception. 
Therefore, we limit our analysis to the scope of the 
search. 
1f 11 The second prong of the Terry analysis asks 
whether the scope of the search was reasonably 
related to the circumstances that justified the 
interference. See id.; accord State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996); State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). In other words, we 
must determine whether the subsequent action of 
searching the coat and shoes was within the scope 
of the frisk conducted on Peterson's person. 
K 12 Utah courts have addressed the issue of 
scope in different contexts. In Johnson, 805 P.2d at 
764, the Utah Supreme Court held that running a 
warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that 
had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate 
scope of detention. Similarly, in State v. White, 856 
P.2d 656 (Utah Ct.App.1993), we held that the 
police officer exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk 
when the need for a frisk had dissipated. 
Furthermore, in State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 
68 P.3d 1052, we held that a police officer's request 
for a defendant's identification during the arrest of 
another person "exceeded the scope of the reasons 
justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily 
expanded its duration in scope." Id. at U 8. In fact, 
the scope of the detention was "limited to ensuring 
that defendant had no weapon in his hands and was 
in no position to violently interfere with the arrest." 
Id. at 1J22. 
U 13 As in Terry and the above cases, the 
authority and scope of a frisk for weapons carried 
out by Officer Billings must be "narrowly drawn." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The facts of 
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the present case are undisputed. After Officer 
Billings entered the room, Peterson suddenly 
emerged from the closet. Fearing for his own safety 
and the safety of others present, Officer Billings 
lawfully and justifiably conducted a pat-down of 
Peterson's person. After ensuring that Peterson did 
not have a weapon, Officer Billings asked another 
officer to escort Peterson outside. Peterson was 
then removed from the room and ultimately from 
the premises. There then remained no reasonable 
expectation or apprehension that Peterson could 
access a weapon or would otherwise interfere with 
the welfare check. The circumstances *649 that 
justified the pat-down, namely the search for 
weapons, were no longer present when Officer 
Billings searched the coat that was lying on the 
floor. Therefore, when Officer Billings picked up 
the coat and patted it down for weapons, he 
exceeded the scope of the lawful frisk. The 
evidence seized from the coat and shoes is therefore 
not admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
If 14 We are persuaded that the search of 
Peterson's coat exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. 
The safety and weapons concerns were no longer 
present after Peterson had been frisked and 
removed from the premises. We therefore reverse 
the convictions. 
f 15 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judges. 
77 P.3d 646, 481 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT App 
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He's still securing the area, it's still a Terry frisk. 
And the state would ask that you rule that way, 
Your Honor. Thank you. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
Well, these are interesting facts and I think I 
need to, I need to make some factual findings before I rule 
on the law. 
As I see the evidence and as I understand the 
evidence this is, this is how I find it for the purposes of 
this hearing. The officers had a report of, and I can only 
take it as anonymous because it was never described, it was 
apparently dispatched so we don't know where the report came 
from. But the information they were given was that there was 
meth, methamphetamine possibly being used by injection, but 
at least being used in front of children in the apartment, 
and that they were going to the apartment for the purpose of 
determining if children were in danger because of meth use in 
their presence. 
The officer testified from his experience that when 
there is suspected drug use in a residence or in a situation 
like that that there's a heightened amount of danger, that he 
goes into it with a, a raised level of apprehension and 
concern. 
He knocked on the door. It was answered by an 
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older lady and then who was soon joined by a younger lady who 
was apparently the tenant of the home, she testified at the 
preliminary hearing. 
The officer entered the apartment, walked through 
the apartment, up some stairs, down a hall, around a turn, 
down a hall, and into a bedroom. It was a back bedroom, it 
was, there was a baby in the bedroom in the crib. The room 
was unusually dark, darker than just from turning off the 
lights, the shades were drawn and there were additional 
blankets or sheets or something put up to make the room 
darker than normal. The mother stepped into the room to 
attend to the baby. It had been explained to the mother that 
the concern was whether or not drugs had been used in the 
room. The officer followed the mother into the room several 
feet, several steps, I don't recall which. But he had 
clearly entered the room, had not at that point noticed the 
defendant, had been there for a couple of seconds, briefly 
entered the room. 
At that point the defendant came from the closet. 
The closet, as I understand it the doors were not closed but 
the defendant had not been seen. Whether because of the way 
he was positioned in the closet or because it was dark, it 
wasn't made clear, but he hadn't been noticed. He came from 
the area of the closet quickly. 
The mother was surprised. Her testimony was, and 
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I'm looking at page 33 of the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing, page 33 line 14, the question was... Well, starting 
at line 11. Well starting at the beginning of the page. 
The question was: 
Q. "Were you in the room when Mr. Peterson 
came from out of the closet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did that surprise you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. I thought he was still in the kitchen 
with my mother. 
Q. Where was he when the officers arrived? 
A. In the kitchen. 
Q. He was in the kitchen? Do you know what 
he had, did you know that he had then 
gone and hid in the closet? 
A. No, I didn't know where he went. 
Q. when you saw him go out of the closet 
what did you exclaim? 
A. I screaming out my mother and"... 
And I said, "I'm sorry"? 
The witness said: 
A. "! I screaming out my mom and asked her 
why her boyfriend was in my room." 
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So the mother was startled, was surprised and was 
concerned that he had somehow gotten to the, gotten to the 
room. So she was frightened. The officer was frightened, 
a sudden movement. 
What happened next is that the officer stopped him, 
put up his hands, whether he spoke to him or whether he 
physically stopped him, he stopped him, turned him around, he 
did a frisk and had him removed from the room. And then 
within 60 seconds later, I think at the outside it was 
within, within a minute, within 60 seconds or a little less 
he, he sees the coat. He says is this his coat? And a seven 
year old child, a girl says yes, that's his coat. And he 
feels the coat, feels the syringe, and then took the coat out 
to him and found that he had been taken out to the front 
porch. Those are the facts as I understand them. 
I'm, I'm really uncomfortable applying the arrest 
and search doctrine in cases. Those, those cases, Chimmel 
(phonetic) was an automobile stop, and most of those cases 
arise from stops on the freeway or stops of vehicles. And, 
and it's very plain that the court is making a bright line so 
that officers don't have to make those judgment calls, can I 
search, can I not search. We don't want them, for instance, 
taking a defendant out of a car and making him stand by the 
side of the road to justify their search, when it would be 
simply safer to put him in the patrol car and secure the 
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situation before you do a search. 
And in any one of those cases that I'm familiar 
with, a Terry frisk of his car is, is really a stretch. 
Usually what it is is that the officer would have the right 
to search the car, they have some probable cause, they have 
some suspicion that justifies a search of the car if the 
defendant is there. And the courts have said you don't have 
to leave him there because that's dumb and it's not safe by 
the side of the road. And there are all these circumstances 
that have to do with automobiles and roadways for officer 
safety. None of them apply. This is a house. 
The question for me and the totality of the 
circumstances, the initial frisk was justified, that's the 
first question. And I find that it was. We've got a 
heightened, a heightened concern because of potential drug 
use, we've got a baby in the room, we've got a darkened room, 
we've got a person who is by all accounts surprisingly in the 
room, certainly to the mother, to the officer, who bolts out, 
comes quickly. The officer is justified in that totality of 
circumstances being concerned about his person. And 
stopping the defendant, conducting a Terry frisk and removing 
him from the room is completely consistent with the totality 
of the circumstances as I see it. He was there to remove 
potential drug use from babies. And, and while he hasn't, 
he doesn't, doesn't have proof of drug use he has a situation 
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that's a concern to the mother, obviously, she didn't expect 
this man to be in the room. And, and we've got a sudden 
movement. The Terry frisk and the action to protect his 
security is absolutely justified. Remove him from the 
room. 
The nub of this case falls on whether or not he was 
justified in picking up that coat and checking it for 
weapons. We don't... We expect officers to act reasonably 
and we, we consider whether or not they're reasonable by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only 
imagine (short inaudible) Barney Fife conducting a search, 
making sure the man had no weapons, and then turning around 
and handing him the weapon. How dumb is that. If, if 
there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon 
and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a 
matter of courtesy hand him a coat but not check it for 
weapons that's, that's ludicrous. 
And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the 
coat because of the totality of these circumstances was so 
closely related in time that it was reasonably related to 
removing him from the room, and that it was practically and 
reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure 
that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting 
the Terry frisk. 
Therefore, I deny the motion. 
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MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor may I, may I make two 
additional points? 
THE JUDGE: No. I've ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: May I point you to another case? 
THE JUDGE: Save it for the court of appeals. 
You've made your argument, I've ruled. The motion is 
denied. 
MR. EASTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: If you wish to prepare findings I'll 
be happy to consider them. But I'm, I'm not going to 
consider additional argument, Counsel. I've ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, I'd like to point the case, to 
the State vs. Beavers which indicates— 
THE JUDGE: Well— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: —that if there's an exigency— 
THE JUDGE: Counsel— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Created by the police that— 
THE JUDGE: Counsel, I have ruled. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. Now I would, I would make an 
additional motion, Your Honor, for the Court to reconsider 
its ruling based on State vs. Beavers, and I've got that case 
here if you need it. 
THE JUDGE: I'm very familiar with State vs. 
Beavers. That wasn't a (inaudible word) search, and I 
understand the circumstances of the case. But in my view the 
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totality of the circumstances there and here are different. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: And may I, may I ask so the ruling 
of the Court is that the search of the coat falls under the 
Terry frisk doctrine? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. That it's, it's a reasonable 
check for weapons before he hands him the coat due to the 
fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is 
there, it's his coat, he removes the coat with the— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: May I ask the Court to make an 
amendment to their findings that, and I think it's supported 
by the state, by the testimony of Officer Billings, that 
Mr. Peterson never asked for the coat? 
MR. EASTON: I think that's in the record, Your 
Honor. 
THE JUDGE: That's in the record. What I will 
tell you to do because I know that this is a potential basis 
for appeal, it's critical to the case, either of you or both 
of you prepare findings. If you can come to an agreement on 
the findings or one of you wants to prepare them and submit 
them, I'll be happy to look at the findings and sign them so 
you can have your complete record. I think you understand 
it. 
We're set for trial next Monday. Are there other 
STATE VS. DANIEL J. PETERSON JANUARY 24, 2002 
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber 


























issues we can or need to address before the trial? 
MR. EASTON: I believe in our conference call the 
other day it was unclear based after the determination of 
this motion whether it would still be a jury trial. 
THE JUDGE: It is unless somebody asks me to waive 
the jury or asks to waive the jury and— 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor, if I could have a few 
minutes to talk with Mr. Easton— 
THE JUDGE: Certainly. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: — and my client Mr. Peterson, we 
might have some work to do on that. 
THE JUDGE: We'll take a short recess for five 
minutes or so. Let me know if you need to come back. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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